RedLatentEvidence before autonomy.

Independent research desk / Authorized assessment

Explore the research

A research desk for AI-enabled offensive security and the adversarial testing of AI systems.

Refine your search
Reset
13 entries / editorial collectionLatest editorial update
Editor’s selectionSource-led
AI-enabled offense · Agent workflows

Before more autonomy, demand a better evidence trail

Use an agent’s task tree to organize an authorized assessment—not to certify its conclusions. What must survive the handoff to a human reviewer?

Sources: PentestGPT
Editorial update
Lab ideaUntested hypothesis
AI-enabled offense · Agent workflows

Build an API authorization matrix from the spec and role policy

Use AI to draft coverage across endpoints, identities, and object ownership—then check the gaps in an isolated staging API.

Sources: OpenAPI Specification v3.2.1
Editorial update
Lab ideaUntested hypothesis
AI-enabled offense · Code review

Turn a code diff into a focused authorization test plan

Use AI to connect changed routes, identity checks, and data access—then turn the supported leads into tests a human can verify.

Sources: Claude Code Security Reviewer
Editorial update
Research briefSource-led
AI-enabled offense · Vulnerability discovery

A generated fuzz target is a starting point, not a finding

Separate harness quality, reachable coverage, reproducible crashes, and confirmed security impact before judging AI-assisted vulnerability discovery.

Sources: A Framework for Fuzz Target Generation and Evaluation
Editorial update
Research briefSource-led
Adversarial AI · Evaluation

Test the task, not just the refusal

Evaluate legitimate completion, policy violations, and scorer disagreement separately when testing an AI application.

Sources: AgentDojo · Python Risk Identification Tool for generative AI (PyRIT) · garak, LLM vulnerability scanner · Promptfoo · MITRE ATLAS™
Editorial update
Research briefSource-led
AI-enabled offense / Adversarial AI · Agent workflows

Put the permission boundary outside the agent

AI-assisted assessment should not ask the same model to propose an action and decide whether it is authorized.

Sources: PentestGPT · Security Best Practices · Cybersecurity AI · CAI
Editorial update
Research briefSource-led
AI-enabled offense · Code review

AI code review has a trust boundary of its own

A review assistant can help triage changed code. That does not make the pull request a safe source of instructions.

Sources: Claude Code Security Reviewer
Editorial update
Research briefSource-led
AI-enabled offense · Evaluation

A benchmark score needs its operating conditions

Task splits, guidance, budgets, and graders determine what an agent’s score actually means. Compare like with like before selecting a workflow.

Sources: Cybench · NYU CTF Bench · CyberSecEval 4 — CybersecurityBenchmarks · CVE-Bench
Editorial update
Lab ideaUntested hypothesis
Adversarial AI · Tool permissions

Will an approval gate hold when the context changes?

Test authorization at the tool boundary using synthetic users and a mock downstream service.

Sources: Security Best Practices · AgentDojo
Editorial update
Lab ideaUntested hypothesis
AI-enabled offense · Vulnerability discovery

Can a generated harness earn its extra coverage?

Keep harness validity and reproducibility in the denominator of AI-assisted fuzzing.

Sources: A Framework for Fuzz Target Generation and Evaluation
Editorial update
Lab ideaUntested hypothesis
AI-enabled offense · Evaluation

Does the advantage survive a held-out task?

Separate workflow development from evaluation when comparing offensive-security assistants.

Sources: Cybench · NYU CTF Bench · CVE-Bench
Editorial update